

# **The Impacts of Terrorism on Tourism in the EU**

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Bachelor Thesis for Obtaining the Degree

Bachelor of Business Administration in

Tourism and Hospitality Management

Submitted to LidijaLalicic, Ph.D.

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
Vienna, 25. April 2018

Affidavit

I hereby affirm that this Bachelor's Thesis represents my own written work and that I have used no sources and aids other than those indicated. All passages quoted from publications or paraphrased from these sources are properly cited and attributed.

The thesis was not submitted in the same or in a substantially similar version, not even partially, to another examination board and was not published elsewhere.

25.04.2018

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## **Abstract**

This paper argues that little research has been made on the possible impacts that terrorism has on tourism. It mainly deals with and presents possible ways to overcome the effects of a crisis in order to ensure a sustainable recovery strategy. To fill up the gap between ‘crisis’ and ‘recovery’, the present thesis provides a theoretical framework and will then emphasize its practical use through case studies based on the terror attacks which took place in Paris back in November 2015 and Brussels in March 2016.

This paper will first discuss the terminology and history of the notion of ‘terrorism’, moving forward to the role of terrorist groups. It will also provide an insight into the Islamic State responsible for the investigated case studies. Then it will offer an overview on the effects on tourism illustrating several examples and will finally elaborate on crisis recovery strategies by bringing into discussing possible frameworks and guidelines to deal with during an attack. Their practical use will be reflected in the two case studies and the reactions associated to them (on a national and international level).

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Problem Statement

One of the problems our society is currently facing, is the increased number of terrorist attacks. According to the World Economic Forum (2015) terrorism has been increasing the last 15 years dramatically, leading to a five time increase in terrorism related to death since 2000. At the very least, 18 terroristic attacks related to tourism targets have been reported following the 9/11 attack (Paraskevas & Arendell: 2007). Terrorism incidents are not easy to compare since they differ in terms of places they occur, the responsible radicals behind them and the implications following an attack (World Economic Forum: 2015). In the past, terrorist attacks had often hit countries unprepared, however following several terrorist attacks around the world, governments and industries have started to recognize the impacts of terrorism and are continuously developing better recovery strategies in order to manage these attacks in the most effective way. Reducing their impact and aiming at a reduction of attacks in the upcoming years are governmental top priorities (World Economic Forum: 2015). However, to deliver an effective response to an attack, research is needed on recovery strategies, which will allow cities to retake their normal course in a shorter period of time, will save money and energy and will help tourism recover. According to Ritchie (2004) a competent and strong plan for managing disaster is crucial for the tourism sector.

## 1.2. Research Questions

This paper analyzes the impact of terrorism on tourism especially on European cities such as Paris and Brussels. Furthermore, this thesis will investigate the cities' reaction to a crisis and their methods to overcome the difficulty of the situation in a short and long term. In addition, this paper will indicate how terrorism and safety concerns in other countries outside the EU have had an impact on tourism by shifting a substantial number of European visitors towards safer places inside the EU such as Spain. Hereby this paper provides a holistic overview of the topic on terrorism on tourism industry in Europe.

The guiding research question is: How do EU cities react to a terrorist attack and recover from it, and adapt in order to be a safe tourism destination? Considering the negative impacts of terrorism on tourism, which are reflected in a decrease in the number of tourists

visiting certain cities or countries, research is needed on social and economic factors that mediate cooperation and conflict. Overall, the goal of this study is to analyze which recovery methods destinations have adopted, which ones have delivered the best results and at the same time, which ones could serve as an example for other cities which were faced/might be faced with the same critical situation.

In order to better understand the impacts and recovery processes we will focus on two destinations outside Europe and two within Europe: Washington DC and its recovery strategy in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Bali and its recovery actions after the terrorist bombings from 2002. The thesis will investigate and will focus specifically on the cases of two European cities, Paris and Brussels by describing the background of the attacks, their impacts and how the authorities reacted to them in a short and long term. The reason to investigate this, is to provide useful guideline methods for similar situations which might occur in different parts of Europe.

### **1.3. Relevance of the Present Study**

To emphasize the relevance of this study we need to take into consideration two aspects: the academic relevance and managerial implications.

From an academic point of view, Faulkner (2001) argues that there are only limited numbers of studies on recovery methods from crisis or disasters including terrorist attacks. In addition, our current generations would benefit from such a study by discovering the best methods and by being able to transmit them to future generations.

As far as the managerial perspective is concerned, we need to turn towards authorities, tourism boards, travel agencies, hotels, airline companies and similar institutions which are in a position to recognize and apply the relevant techniques in order to help recovering a city or region after a terrorist attack has occurred. Scott et al. (2008) focuses on this managerial aspect by looking at possibilities on how a destination recovers after a crisis. Finding out the best recovery strategies is not only important for specific cities or regions inside Europe, but it is also vital to regain a secure image and maintain stability beyond the borders of our continent as well.

## 2. Literature review

### 2.1. Terrorism – Definition and Beginnings

Since its occurrence, *terrorism* has undertaken plenty of faces, hence the difficulty to limit the concept to an unanimous definition. Some authors go back to Antiquity in order to find out its origins and relevant information about the first acts of “terror”. This study concentrates however on recent history events which were marked by “terrorism”. Therefore if we look back in recent history, we will see that the word was first used at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century during the French revolution by the *Dictionnaire de l’Académie française* to describe “a regime of terror” (Hoffman: 1998).

Ironically the term had a positive connotation back in the day and it was generally used as a means to implement order, structure and to reestablish the hierarchy in the divided society which had followed the French revolution (1789 until 1799). Moreover, the term held together the notions of virtue, trust and justice, as described by Robespierre in one of his speeches: “Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.” After Robespierre’s execution by guillotine, the term was given a new opposite interpretation by the leaders in charge: abuse of power, illicit implications (Bienvenu: 1970).

Throughout the fascist era, “terrorism” held yet another meaning: mass repression used by totalitarian states and their dictators against their own citizens in order to justify their cruel acts: “Terror? Never. Simply ... social hygiene, taking those individuals out of circulation like a doctor would take out a bacillus.” (Hoffman: 1998). This was the answer given by Mussolini with regards to the fierce measures which were taken against fellow citizen. Similar behaviors were displayed by Hitler and Stalin in a successful attempt to gain total control over their governments and countries.

If we take into consideration the events following the Second World War, we will see that “terrorism” was associated with violent acts of revolt carried out by anti-colonist groups against the imperial supremacies: Israel, Kenya, Cyprus and Algeria are example of countries which won their independence in this way.

Quoted by many authors, one of the first voices who made a clear distinction between “terrorism” and acts of gaining independency from the colonial powers, was Yasir Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly in November 1974. The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist ...'(Hoffman 1998)

During the 1960s and 1970s Quebecois separatist group FLQ (Front de Liberation du Quebec), the Basque ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, or Freedom for the Basque Homeland) adopted terrorism as a radical, ideologically motivated tool. Hofmann (1998) argues that these groups were seeking international coverage, along with sympathy and support. The international attention was thus caught by a series of suicide bombings directed against American diplomatic and military targets in the Middle East. Along with this, the state-sponsored terrorism began to arise, and various governments such as the regimes in Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria became actively involved in sponsoring or commissioning terrorist acts. (Hoffmann:1998)

Further to the 1990s, analysts recognize the rise of the so-called “narco-terrorism”, triggered by the growing power of the Colombian cocaine cartels and their attempts to sabotage Colombia's electoral process and successive governments. At the same time, some analysts started talking about the ‘gray area phenomenon’:

*(...) threats to the stability of sovereign states by non-state actors or non-governmental processes and organizations. They represent a direct threat to the underlying stability, cohesion and fabric of the modern sovereign state(Chalk: 1997).*

The paragraph quoted above, conveys the idea that the range of conflicts across the world are no longer associated with traditionally notions of war as fighting between the armed forces of two or more states, but instead involved irregular forces as one or more of the participants. This helps us understand how “terrorism” shifted again to now describe a notion of non-state conflict.

An important voice when it comes to “terrorism” is represented by The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which describes “terrorism” as activities with the following characteristics:

- Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;
- Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping;
- Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (FBI: 2018)

The FBI definition emphasizes notions, such as “outside the territorial jurisdiction” or “transcend national boundaries”, making the term broader by including these aspects as well, apart from governments and citizens. Another significant aspect is the recognition of the political objectives as one of the aims of “terrorism” (“to influence the policy of a government”). Moreover, the FBI definitions aim at freedom, and describe “terrorism” as any act which could threaten this freedom. This can be better understood by taking into consideration Ronald Reagan’s distinction between “terrorist” and “freedom fighters” (which underlines the idea mentioned by Yasir Arafat):

Effective antiterrorist action has also been thwarted by the claim that—as the quip goes—“One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.” (Reagan: 1986) That's a catchy phrase, but also misleading. Freedom fighters do not need to terrorize a population into submission. Freedom fighters target the military forces and the organized instruments of repression keeping dictatorial regimes in power. Freedom fighters struggle to liberate their citizens from oppression and to establish a form of government that reflects the will of the people. (Reagan: 1986)

Moving further to the 21st century the United Nations (UN) Secretary general’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) defines terrorism as

*any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. (UN: 2004)*

This definition is believed to include the actions of terrorism groups of the 21st century. The terrorism groups which are currently threatening the world peace and stability the most, are the Islamic State, Hamas, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, Taliban, Al-Qaeda as well as others.

Following the attack of 2001 in the USA, a terroristic group originating from the Middle East named IS came to rise portraying themselves as freedom fighters. They were later responsible for a number of attacks in Europe including the two most significant ones analyzed in this paper: Paris 2015 and Brussels 2016. The following chapter gives an overview of the IS developments and consequently on the attacks which followed within Europe.

## **2.2. The Rise of IS in Middle East and in Europe**

The jihadist Group IS (Islamic State) made its debut on the political and international scene in 2014. After taking over the control of territories in Syria and Iraq, they officially named its governmental state a “caliphate” and asked Muslims and other jihadist group around the world to recognize the supremacy of Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and return to territory under its control (BBC: 2015).

The members proclaimed the fact that they wanted to restore the “order” of God on Earth and that they are defending the Muslim community against the disbelievers and against everyone who would harm Islam. After the US invasion in Iraq in 2004, IS had been organized and re-organized several times and held different names, among which the best known are IS (Islamic State) and "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (Isis) (BBC: 2015).

As far as the territory controlled by IS is concerned, it was argued that it covered 210,000km<sup>2</sup> back in 2014. Nowadays the numbers indicated are a loss of “15,000-20,000 km<sup>2</sup> of territory in Iraq of what it controlled in August 2014, and 2,000-4,000 km in Syria, or about 5-10%.” Despite this, the militant group has succeeded in regaining the power over strategic areas, by themselves and by receiving financial aid from wealthy private donors or Islamic charities that are in favor of banishing Syria's President Assad. Although such funding is used to finance the travel of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, nowadays IS is self-funding (BBC: 2015).

The spread of IS in Middle East and its rise has had an impact on Europe as well. In 2014, 200,000 people embarked on a sea journey to seek asylum in Europe compared to 60,000 the previous year, according to statistics from the U.N. refugee agency UNHCR.

A true concern is that fighters could join the refugee emigration passing by the Syrian-Turkish border and make their way through Greece and the Balkans and into Western Europe. There is insignificant evidence, however, of non-European ISIS fighters infiltrating Europe in this way. A far more effective ISIS strategy appears to be developing an army of soldiers living within the European Union borders who are recruited either online or on the battlefield.

EUROPOL's statistics suggest that between 3922 and 4294 citizens are foreign fighters from the E.U. Out of which 30% returned and 14% were confirmed dead (ICCT, 2016). IS is now leading the recruitment for those fighters, who can use their E.U. passports to travel across the continent undetected because of the open borders policy, then enter Turkey and finally move across Syria. The concern for European governments and their security institutions is that these young men and women might return radicalized and trigger attacks in their home lands.

In 2014, Belgium became the first E.U. country to experience an attack by a “foreign fighter” returning from Syria when a man of French origin – Mehdi Nemmouche – opened fire in a Jewish museum in Brussels, killing four people. On November 13th, 2015, a coordinated terrorist attack in Paris killed 130 people and injured around 352 others, according to the NATO Review Magazine (NATO: 2015). Based on the investigations which were carried out, it has been found that at least eight of the plotters, including attackers and facilitators, were foreign fighters returning from Syria. The men identified as carrying out the attacks were French nationals. The leader was a well-known Belgian foreign fighter, Abdelhamid Abaaoud (Brisard: 2015). This case will be further elaborated and commented on in our chapter dedicated to the Paris attack. In January 2016, police killed two young Belgian men who had travelled to Syria. One of the suspects appeared in an IS video, in which he was driving a car carrying dead bodies across the desert. The federal prosecutor, Eric Van Der Sypt, said a terrorist attack may only have been hours away: “This operation stopped a major terrorist attack from taking place. You could say a second potential Paris has been averted.” (The Guardian: 2015)

The above-mentioned examples are representing a strong proof that the IS power within the European borders needs to be reduced and eventually exterminated. The EU

*Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism* highlights three objectives:

- To disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism;
- To ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism;
- To promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all.

(EU: 2005)

In this regard, we can point out some examples of how the European governments are trying to monitor radical Islamists and to reduce their influence within their home borders.

The Counterterrorism chief, Dick Schoof, from The Netherlands informed that Dutch intelligence and law agencies were working with other European partners in order to monitor the threat. They are monitoring “jihadist travelers” and police are making efforts to seize radicalization in Dutch towns and cities (Hurriyet: 2013).

French police arrested four suspects who were trying to join radical Islamic fighters in West Africa. At the same time the authorities removed radical imams which were seen as dangerous to the public order. Furthermore, German authorities banned three ultra-conservative Salafi Muslim groups which officials said wanted to abolish democracy and install a system based on shariah (the Islamic law). The Ministry of Interior announced it has banned the organizations “DawaFFM” and “Islamische Audios,” as well as “An-Nussrah.”(Hurriyet: 2013)

The above-mentioned examples can help the Western governments reflect on their own borders and limits when it comes to radical manifestations of Islam. In order to avoid nurturing a vulnerable society, serious public debates and strict government policies should be indispensable. The next chapter of this thesis will analyze how a terrorist attack can impact tourism and which consequences an attack brings for destinations in terms of resources and economy. These consequences are reflected for example in the loss of infrastructure, decrease in bookings, cancellation of services etc.

### **2.3. The Terrorist Attacks and the International Travel Tourism**

The international travel and tourism have a great impact on the economic growth and development of a country. This aspect can be seriously threatened if a particular city was the scene of a terrorist attack (Baker: 2014). The tourism industry can suffer tremendously after

an attack that causes confusion and destruction. Fear is generated among tourists who think twice before visiting a destination leading to cancellations (World Economic Forum: 2015). The destination is one of the major factors that influence the amount of flight ticket and holiday cancellations. After the attack in 2011 in the US several airports were not functioning leading to the cancellation of a large number of flights. Once the airports were operating again, airlines suffered a loss of more than 30% in demand (World Economic Forum: 2015).

As acknowledged in the last example, the costs after such a terrorist attack are substantial. In addition to cancellations as well as the destruction of property one has to also consider all the indirect costs that are lost which could include unemployment rate rising, reduction of foreign investment due to safety concerns, less consumption, less trade and of course a reduction in tourism overall (World Economic Forum: 2015). Costs incurred due to terrorist attacks are very difficult to calculate, especially when it comes to the indirect costs. Following the attacks in Boston it was estimated that the total costs of the attack were around \$438 million, out of which approximately \$31 million covered the damage of property, medicinal costs and the cities lockdown (World Economic Forum: 2015). Another example is Brussels which spent around \$57,9 million a day to keep the city on lock down following the Paris attacks (World Economic Forum: 2015). Implementing a lockdown is most likely the first measure of recovery trying to regain the sense of security among the cities inhabitants and tourists in order to regain a peaceful environment.

However, even if the political entities try to rebuild the original environment of peace and security, tourists seem to be more reluctant in choosing those destinations. Interesting enough, the trend is not noticeable when it comes to going to places which are described as being natural-caused disasters (Baker: 2014).

After the terrorist attacks from 2015 in Paris, it has been shown that the tourist rate decreased by 10% in the French hotels. Tourists prefer to either skip those particular destinations or to shorten their stay. The same trend has been noticed when it comes to eating in restaurants (Tourmag: 2015). Moreover, a decrease in hotels booking has been observed as a direct consequence of the terrorist attacks (Tourmag: 2015).

However, the fear the tourists are facing is direct proportional with the types of bombing or the attacks, the reason which triggered the attack being very important and the reaction of the country at cause. On average, it takes approximately 13 months for a place to recover from a terrorist attack, according to research from the WTTC (2015). In the following

Figure 1 provided by the WTTC (2015) one can see the average recovery time in month for each crisis category, 13 months being the shortest recovery time compared to another crisis:

**Figure 1: Average Crisis Recovery Time**

Crisis Category	Average Recovery Time (Months)
Political Turmoil	26.7
Terrorism	13.0
Pandemic	21.3
Environmental Disaster	23.8

(Source: World Travel and Tourism Council: 2015)

This period could still be extended given the severity of the French attacks, according to the World Economic Forum (2015). In the case that European tourists are afraid of the chance of other terrorist attacks in Europe the general confidence in travelling could decrease, leading to a longer recovery period (World Economic Forum: 2015).

Rochelle Turner, director of research at the World Travel & Tourism Council, has a more optimistic view on the impacts of terrorism on tourism:

*The recent terrorist incidents are predominantly regional—they are isolated incidents that impact the region in which it has happened, but do not impact travel and tourism on a macro-economic level. One of the reactions we see from travelers is that they change destinations, but they do not tend to stop traveling as a whole (Lagrave: 2016).*

Reflecting on this statement it is clear that tourists will most likely not stop traveling, however they will most likely change destinations to a more secure location. According to a survey by `Travelzoo`, 30% of UK travelers rate security as the most important variable when choosing their holiday destination leading to an increase in visitor numbers to beach resorts located in Spain, Portugal and Greece and a decrease of visitors to Tunisia and Egypt following several terrorist attacks in both locations (The Guardian: 2016). Of course, this shift of demand also has an impact on tourism companies. A good example in this respect is the tour operator 'Thomson'. The company cancelled all 2016 holidays to Tunisia until 31st of

October (The Guardian: 2016). 'Thomas Cook' also adjusted their offer by increasing flights to Spain, Portugal as well as Bulgaria (The Guardian: 2016).

It is estimated that due to this shift of tourism destination countries such as Egypt, Turkey and Tunisia will face a decrease of 4,6 million tourists in 2016 with 2,2 million of these tourists travelling instead to Spain (The Guardian: 2016). According to Rafael Gallego, president of the Spanish travel agents and tour operators association, the terrorist attacks at competing similar beach destinations led to a direct increase of around 12-15% of tourist which would not have occurred without this tragic events in Northern African destinations (The Guardian: 2016).

This aspect helps us understand that a shift in tourism destination is more likely to occur if the destination shows similarities to other destinations. According to a report by the 'Paris Conventions' and 'Visitors Bureau' if a destination is interchangeable and has nothing that makes it stand out, the effects following a crisis will have a much stronger influence on how the destination is perceived as well as on the number of visitors (ParisInfo: 2015). If we compare this statement with the statement of the city of Paris, the DMO concludes that Paris is unique therefore not interchangeable and has a solid image going far beyond its tangible attractiveness leading most likely to a shorter recovery period after a crisis due to its outstanding image (ParisInfo: 2015).

However, one can not only rely on its uniqueness and image for a short recovery period. According to the World Economic Forum there is a need for security protocols, which would enable destinations and countries to recover in a faster manner provided the protocols are well created and implemented correctly (World Economic Forum: 2015). One of the major factors in implementing the above, is to start the security protocol as soon as possible instead of letting time pass. Crisis protocols, recovery strategies, strong emergency plans are indispensable for nations to recover faster. In order to resolve all issues or the majority of the issues following a terrorist attack, partnering with other nations is a key factor in such an emergency situation (World Economic Forum: 2015). A positive example in this respect, is the London Underground bombing in 2005. The government responded fast and significantly being very proactive which led to modest tourism effects on the destination (World Economic Forum: 2015).

Based on the example above we will now turn to analyzing recovery strategies first from a theoretical and then from a practical point of view.

## 2.4. Crisis Recovery Strategies


In order to reduce the above-mentioned effects, governments should establish crisis recovery strategies that are meant to recover faster from a crisis situation such as natural disasters, epidemics, war or in our case of terrorism.

Since crisis is a broad complex topic it is difficult to find a universal definition but for clarity purposes we will make reference to Selbst (1978 in Faulkner 2001:136) who defined a crisis as "any action or failure to act that interferes with an (organization's) ongoing functions, the acceptable attainment of its objectives, its viability or survival, or that has a detrimental personal effect as perceived by the majority of its employees, clients or constituents. "As we can see the keywords in his definition are actions, failure to act that hinders the objectives of the organizations with effects on the stakeholders involved, such as employees, clients or constituents.

In addition to this definition the paper will provide several crisis frameworks to have a better understanding of crisis stages and present recovery strategies for each stage.

The World Tourism Organization model shown in Figure 2 illustrates the stages after a crisis (WTO,1998:156, as cited in Scott et al.: 2008). According to them, a number of strategies can be taken in order to recover from a decline in demand, ensuring that the number of tourists' visits return to *normality*: *normality* being reaching similar demand as before the crisis occurred. It is believed that this normality is restored by managing media and tourists' reactions to the disaster in order to avoid a drop of visitors to the site. The WTO gives suggestions, such as the creation of media coverage by the affected destination. The World Economic Forum (2015) supports this strategy arguing that tourists can be attracted again after a crisis through effective media campaigns that are able to change tourist impression of a destination. In a recovery plan communication plays an essential role. It is believed that domestic travel is not easily affected by one attack, however international tourism is very responsive to danger warning portrayed by the media. (World Economic Forum: 2015)

**Figure 2: Stage Model of a Tourism Crisis**



(Source: Based on WTO 1998, page 156 as quoted in Scott et al.: 2008 )

There are a number of stage models that aim to provide a framework on crisis management. When analyzing the different stages of a crisis, Fink (1986) and Roberts (1994) (Figure 2) created slightly distinct models, suggesting a linear approach.

According to Ritchie (2004), these framework models are valuable as they portray possible strategies that can be implemented or developed at different stages and can even stop a crisis progress from one stage to the next. In addition to the strategies presented in Figure 3, Faulkner (2001) argues that in order to recover from each stage mentioned in Fink (1986) and Roberts (1994) recovery strategies need to express clear procedures to overcome them. For that reason, Faulkner(2001) synthesized the research done by Quarantelli (1984) and Turner (1994).

### Figure 3: Fink and Roberts Framework Model of a Tourism Crisis

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Table 1  
Stages in a community's response to a disaster

Composite stages	Fink's (1986) stages	Robert's (1994) stages
1. Pre-event		<i>Pre-event</i> : where action can be taken to prevent disasters (e.g. growth management planning or plans aimed at mitigating the effects of potential disasters)
2. Prodromal	<i>Prodromal stage</i> : when it becomes apparent that the crisis is inevitable	
3. Emergency	<i>Acute stage</i> : the point of no return when the crisis has hit and damage limitation is the main objective	<i>Emergency phase</i> : when the effects of the disaster has been felt and action has to be taken to rescue people and property
4. Intermediate		<i>Intermediate phase</i> : when the short-term needs of the people affected must be dealt with — restoring utilities and essential services. The objective at this point being to restore the community to normality as quickly as possible
5. Long term (recovery)	<i>Chronic stage</i> : clean-up, post-mortem, self-analysis and healing	<i>Long-term phase</i> : continuation of the previous phase, but items that could not be addressed quickly are attended to at this point (repair of damaged infrastructure, correcting environmental problems, counselling victims, reinvestment strategies, debriefings to provide input to revisions of disaster strategies)
6. Resolution	<i>Resolution</i> : routine restored or new improved state	

(Source: as quoted by Faulkner: 2001, p. 140)

Turner (1994) presents effective guidance on how to develop a recovery strategy. The author emphasizes the importance of creating a crisis recovery committee that meets regularly to share information. Secondly, the author notes the importance of risk assessment by identifying possible disasters and evaluating the chance of this potential risks actually taking place. Following this, short and long-term effects of a potential crisis have to be identified. This leads to the creation of strategies that prevent or reduce negative effects, action plans are developed, resources and responsibilities are allocated, and a clear chain of command is established. Finally, a manual is published with guidelines that relevant organizations and agencies are obliged to follow and in which important contact information is included.

Quarantelli (1984) focuses less on the development but more on the implementation that needs to be in place in order for a strategy to be effective. He suggests holding trainings, crisis simulations and practices. Furthermore, he suggests the need to create new training techniques through the transmission of existing knowledge and evaluate them. In addition, Quarantelli (1984) mentions the importance of informing and incorporating the public as well as the relevant staff from organizations in the planned procedures. Quarantelli (1984) argues

that relevant stakeholders need to be involved in the creation of a recovery strategy in order for it to be effective. The need of acquiring, locating and preserving the resource materials are vital for an effective strategy. Furthermore, the author argues that creating informal links between relevant parties in order to exchange and inform about future potential disasters is very important. Moreover, drafting organizational crisis procedures and incorporating them with public mass crisis plans is also essential. Finally, continuous updates of strategies and resources are necessary to keep up with potential threats.

In order to combine crisis frameworks with recovery strategies Faulkner (2001) created one of the most extensive general framework for tourism crisis management. Faulkner's (2001) framework illustrated in Figure 4 advises users how to react properly in each stage of a crisis and gives an insight in management responses. Although the model comprises seven stages, it is mainly divided into three parts: the pre-event which stands before the crisis, the prodromal, emergency, intermediate and long term(recovery) which takes place during short and long term after the crisis and the resolution which reviews the outcome after a crisis has passed. The model indicates possible management actions and tasks that can be used at each stage as part of a crisis and recovery strategy. For clarity purpose we will not detail on all the stages, but we will provide the tool necessary to reach *normality* as described in the previous chapter.

**Figure 4: Faulkner Tourism Crisis Management Framework**

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*B. Faulkner / Tourism Management 22 (2001) 135–147*

Table 4  
Tourism disaster management framework

Phase in disaster process	Elements of the disaster management responses	Principal ingredients of the disaster management strategies
<p>1. <i>Pre-event</i> When action can be taken to prevent or mitigate the effects of potential disasters</p>	<p><i>Precursors</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Appoint a disaster management team (DMT) leader and establish DMT</li> <li>● Identify relevant public/private sector agencies/organisations</li> <li>● Establish coordination/consultative framework and communication systems</li> <li>● Develop, document and communicate disaster management strategy</li> <li>● Education of industry stakeholders, employees, customers and community</li> <li>● Agreement on, and commitment to, activation protocols</li> </ul>	<p><i>Risk assessment</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Assessment of potential disasters and their probability of occurrence</li> <li>● Development of scenarios on the genesis and impacts of potential disasters</li> <li>● Develop disaster contingency plans</li> </ul>
<p>2. <i>Prodromal</i> When it is apparent that a disaster is imminent</p>	<p><i>Mobilisation</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Warning systems (including general mass media)</li> <li>● Establish disaster management command centre</li> <li>● Secure facilities</li> </ul>	<p><i>Disaster contingency plans</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Identify likely impacts and groups at risk</li> <li>● Assess community and visitor capabilities to cope with impacts</li> <li>● Articulate the objectives of individual (disaster specific) contingency plans</li> <li>● Identify actions necessary to avoid or minimise impacts at each stage</li> <li>● Devise strategic priority (action) profiles for each phase <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Prodromal</i></li> <li>○ <i>Emergency</i></li> <li>○ <i>Intermediate</i></li> <li>○ <i>Long-term recovery</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p>3. <i>Emergency</i> The effect of the disaster is felt and action is necessary to protect people and property</p>	<p><i>Action</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Rescue/evacuation procedures</li> <li>● Emergency accommodation and food supplies</li> <li>● Medical/health services</li> <li>● Monitoring and communication systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● On-going review and revision in the light of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Experience</i></li> <li>○ <i>Changes in organisational structures and personnel</i></li> <li>○ <i>Changes in the environment</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p>4. <i>Intermediate</i> A point where the short-term needs of people have been addressed and the main focus of activity is to restore services and the community to normal</p>	<p><i>Recovery</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Damage audit/monitoring system</li> <li>● Clean-up and restoration</li> <li>● Media communication strategy</li> </ul>	
<p>5. <i>Long-term (recovery)</i> Continuation of previous phase, but items that could not be attended to quickly are attended to at this stage. Post-mortem, self-analysis, healing</p>	<p><i>Reconstruction and reassessment</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Repair of damaged infrastructure</li> <li>● Rehabilitation of environmentally damaged areas</li> <li>● Counselling victims</li> <li>● Restoration of business/consumer confidence and development of investment plans</li> <li>● Debriefing to promote input to revisions of disaster strategies</li> </ul>	
<p>6. <i>Resolution</i> Routine restored or new improved state establishment</p>	<p><i>Review</i></p>	

(Source: Faulkner: 2001)

In addition to his framework Faulkner (2001) notes that this can only be effective if certain principles and ingredients are in place. These principles include a coordinated team approach, consultation and commitment. The coordinated team approach refers to linking together the public and private sector parties that are associated with the tourism sector. The strategy of the newly emerged group should be shared with other public emergency organizations in order to guarantee that it coincides with their strategy. The consultation approach describes the importance of the connection between the tourism sector, other strategically planning organizations (e.g. economic plans, urban plans) and the community. The decisions of other parties are likely to have an impact on the tourism sector and on future strategies, thus it is important to stay connected and offer advises between each sector. Finally, the commitment approach argues that all parties involved in a strategy must know what actions to take and be committed to the strategy in case of a crisis, since no well elaborated strategy can be effective if parties do not follow it (Faulkner, 2001).

In addition to the principles several ingredients to an effective crisis strategy development are mentioned by Faulkner (2001). The ingredients include:

- The Risk assessment: Evaluation of potential risks and threats.
- Prioritization: Rank order of actions that need to be taken according to their importance. Safety of tourist has a high priority.
- Protocols: Agreed rules of conduct are drafted by emergency agencies and tourism organizations. The rules are accepted by all parties to ensure recovery.
- Community capabilities audit: Determining the capability of a community to handle disasters, so that the extent of external assistance can be calculated; (should involve an inventory of resources).
- Disaster management command center: a center of command is crucial
- Media and monitoring activities: it is imperative to create a central source of communication in order to guarantee that inaccurate information is not published as well as to coordinate the recovery. The media is a key element during a disaster maintaining tourists informed during a crisis as well as in the recovery stage by delivering information about the recovery process (safety and services of the destination).

- Warning systems: Warning systems need to be in place to communicate effectively when a crisis is occurring.
- Flexibility: Some elements can be applied to all emergencies therefore they are part of a crisis framework. However, flexibility is important since certain emergencies may require different strategies. Organizations may also have to carry out new or different tasks than they are used, which might require a higher level of flexibility.
- Involvement, education and review: Stakeholders who will implement the strategy need to be involved in the process in order for the strategy to be effective. The strategy has to be continuously updated, to constantly offer new information, in particular after a crisis has been overcome in order to assess if something can be improved.

Scott et al.(2008) argue that beyond saving victims, resuming operations, fixing damaged infrastructure and letting the public know the destination is safe once again, the management of a crisis can go a step further and make use of leadership as a means to recover from a crisis. Practically the authors state that the management procedures following a crisis should be on hold while new measures will take place leaving a moment of uncertainty on how to take action. It is in this moment that leadership is crucial inside an organization as well as towards the number of stakeholders that are involved in the recovery. Leadership is believed to be an important aspect when it comes to prioritizing decisions, taking actions and generating new plans after a crisis event. Scott et al. (2008) believe that looking at an organizations recovery should not take only into account reestablishing organizations business activity to normality, but also at the need to adapt by modifying an organization`s operations, networks, markets. In summary organizations may need to re-invent themselves and look at a crisis as an opportunity for change, innovation and challenging the status-quo.

In addition to the crisis recovery strategies described above, this paper brings into discussion the examples and how the cities of Washington DC and the Indonesian island of Bali dealt with terrorist attacks and will outline some lessons learned.

On a general level, an effective framework for crisis management (as described in this chapter) would include the following stages:

- a. being prepared for crisis management – this means that every tourist destination should be prepared with a plan (rebuilding brand image, reassuring potential visitors of the safety of the area, helping authorities re-establishing the destination`s

attractiveness and functionality). The overall positive consequences of having a plan would be, on a general level, saving time, money and energy.

- b. a crisis management task force – group of governmental officials, local tourism professionals and community leaders who would take care of the implementation of the strategy
- c. a crisis management handbook – this could serve as a guide which could outline the responsibilities of the teams and could also provide a checklist in order to avoid confusion, miscommunication and lack of action among the members.

Keeping the above mentioned in mind, we turn now to two examples around the world and analyze how they dealt with such a situation in the aftermath of a terrorist attacks. In order to do so, the following examples will be discussed: Washington D.C. hotels during the 9/11 crisis, Bali after the 2002 bombings. These examples have been carefully chosen because their reactions can be easily emulated by the cities analyzed in our case studies or by other tourism destinations.

i) It is well known that after the terrorist attacks from 9/11, hotel managers from New York and Washington as well as managers at U.S. major airports were going through a very stressful period in order to regain balance of the operations and to re-establish high levels confidence and safety in their services. According to an essay published at the Cornell University (2002), written by Stafford, Yu and Armoo, the hotels' response can be classified as being internal or external. By internal we mean 'maintaining safe conditions inside their hotels and gathering facts about the attacks' (Stafford, et. al. 2002: 30). Within this category the authors make reference to calming and informing guests, preparing staff members to react in the eventuality of a further event by taking out emergency equipment, placing media equipment (e.g. TV) to public area so guests could monitor easily the development of the events, coordinating activities for an effective communication with the outside world. As far as the external response is concerned, the three authors name the Hotel Association of Washington who was in direct contact with the police and the fire respective departments and who would then be responsible for informing the general managers of the various hotels. In return hotel managers would offer support, assistance after consulting with management.

Dealing with a 52% decrease (Stafford, et. al. 2002: 31) in hotel occupancy is not an easy task. Below for reference is Figure 5 which depicts the tax revenue situation before and after the attacks:

**Figure 5 : Tax Revenue Prior And Following The 9/11 Attack**

**EXHIBIT 3**

D.C.-area hotel performance, 2000–2002

	<b>D.C. Occupancy Rate 2000–2002</b>				
	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>% Change</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>% Change</b>
<i>January</i>	51.19%	57.02%	10.22%	52.08%	-9.49%
<i>February</i>	65.29%	68.49%	4.67%	67.34%	-1.71%
<i>March</i>	81.10%	83.08%	2.38%	77.52%	-7.17%
<i>April</i>	84.96%	81.61%	-4.10%	87.30%	6.52%
<i>May</i>	82.83%	79.19%	-4.60%	79.00%	-0.24%
<i>June</i>	81.76%	80.28%	-1.84%	78.20%	-2.66%
<i>July</i>	76.85%	74.75%	-2.81%		
<i>August</i>	71.46%	67.21%	-6.32%		
<i>September</i>	79.37%	45.99%	-72.58%		
<i>October</i>	81.18%	59.51%	-36.41%		
<i>November</i>	67.18%	57.20%	-17.45%		
<i>December</i>	50.19%	46.66%	-7.57%		

(Source: Compiled from monthly STAR Summary Reports, Smith Travel Research, 2000-2002 as quoted by Stafford, et. al. 2002 in *HOW WASHINGTON, D.C., HOTELS RESPONDED TO TERRORISM* )

We will now have a look at the exact measures which were taken for a faster crisis recovery, but before it is worth mentioning that tourism agencies worked together with government to promote tourism in the District of Columbia. The first step was establishing a coordinate response led by WCTC (DC Convention & Tourism Corporation) from the industry to the public and the media. Secondly, they worked towards re-opening tourist venues (Ronald Reagan National Airport, Dulles International Airport, Baltimore – Washington International Airport, the White House, etc.), by launching campaigns which included improvements in both safety and protocols. Another step which was taken was promoting business travel. A drastic decline in business travelers who preferred meeting outside of the city was what drove the hospitality industry to request the following initiatives: ‘issuing an executive order encouraging federal agencies to continue meetings and training sessions in Washington, urging the State Department to communicate with embassies to encourage international travel to Washington D.C.’, etc. (Stafford, et. al. 2002: 34). A last step turned to media and to media coverage. Since Washington D.C. had become the ‘heart of

an international crisis', aggressive marketing campaigns were launched which targeted local, regional and national travel markets. A local marketing campaign would have themes, e.g. 'Be Inspired in your Hometown' and 'Hometown Homecoming' (Stafford, et. al. 2002:35). The Transit Authority offered free bus and rails passes to the visitors and restaurants or attractions offered special promotions during the weekends.


Some lessons learned from the strategy recovery of Washington D.C. would be having a plan build on solid knowledge of crisis management, regaining the control first internally and then externally, coordinating with all regional stakeholders, engaging the local community and steering local media towards positive success stories from the industry.

ii) In 2002 the Indonesian island of Bali was confronted with a crisis after terrorist bombs exploded in an area very popular among tourists. Its consequences were felt not only on a local level but on a regional level.

Before the attacks Bali, was generating US\$ 1.4 billion of the country's total tourism revenue of US\$ 5.4 billion, tourism accounting for approx. 80% of Bali's total income (Henderson 2003: 45). The 191 dead and over 300 injured had an immediate effect on tourism in Bali and Indonesia: tourists cutting short their holidays, flights were cancelled, all types of accommodation were confronted with a decrease in demand, restaurants and attractions were receiving less and less tourists, etc. The WTO predicted that the island could be US\$4 million poorer due to terrorism (BBC: 2002c). Below a map (Figure 6) on the regions which were affected by this crisis:

**Figure 6 : The affected regions of the Crisis in South East Asia**

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 FIGURE 2. The Impact of the Crisis on Southeast Asia



(BBC, 2002c). The slump in Malaysia’s arrivals of 28% in October was attributed largely to the international warnings (*The Straits Times*, 2002c).

(Source: BBC, 2002c, as quoted by Henderson 2003 in *Terrorism and Tourism: Managing the Consequences of the Bali Bombings* )

In *Journal of Travel & Tourism Marketing*, Joan Henderson (2003) analyses in his article *Terrorism and Tourism: Managing the Consequences of the Bali Bombings*, Bali’s most important steps in an effort to recover from the crisis. Although the author invokes a certain consistency in the data which was published with regards to the recovery strategy, we believe this article conveys a reliable source of inspiration and information. Therefore, the measures taken by the authorities in charge are detailed as follows: first, victims were assisted and foreigners were repatriated while media centers were placed in Bali and Jakarta; the Ministry of Tourism and Culture recommended that all Ministry’s formal meetings to take place in Bali; the minister insisted on all travel warnings to be revoked and inhabitants were asked to move on and industries to go back to normal; sympathy visits to Australia were planned and communication with the market leaders was top priority; domestic tourism agencies were encouraged to offer inexpensive tour packages; improving security measures at the airport and in the immigration services. The head of Bali Tourism Authority held a powerful speech where he made it clear that Bali will not become a ‘ghost town’: *Terrorists can destroy Kuta but they can’t destroy our spirituality, and that is what we have to offer to visitors*” (The Straits Times, 2002b).

If we apply Faulkner’s (2001) model to Bali, we could argue that the disaster started at the emergency stage and progressed to the intermediate. Long-term recovery appeared in the

moment international daily arrivals gave signs of stability. It is worth mentioning that while the programs launched by the public sectors are vital for a successful implementation of a recovery strategy, the reoccurrence of such events and the level of governmental commitment cannot be controlled. Only methods of strong and effective crisis management can ensure that terrorists ‘will be denied a final victory’ (Henderson 2003: 55).

After this general description on the recovery strategies adopted by the hotels in Washington D.C. following the 9/11 attacks and the measures taken by Bali after the 2002 bombings, the next section will now focus on a more detailed and systematic analysis on what tourist destinations can do to ensure an effective and efficient post crisis approach. To illustrate this, we have chosen two very important European cities and touristic destinations, which lie at the heart of our continent and which share not only former territory and history, but they are also main pillars of the EU: Paris and Brussels.

### **3. Case Study and Methods**

In order to have a better understanding of how terrorism can affect tourism, this thesis will provide case studies of the attacks that happened in two different cities located in Europe. The cities examined are Paris and Brussels and this will help us showcase their recovery strategy and demonstrate the effects of a terrorist attack.

#### **3.1. Paris**

In the case of Paris, the attack occurred on the 13th of November in 2015 leaving 130 persons dead and hundreds injured. This attack took place when several terrorists using automatic weapons and explosives targeted a number of locations including a major stadium, a concert hall, restaurant and bars at the same time (BBC: 2015). According to BBC one of the attackers screamed "God is great" in Arabic: this was believed to be the first proof of an Islamic terrorist attack. The attack resulted in a large number of casualties and destruction, triggering major French initiatives to combat terrorism and defining part of the presidency of Françoise Hollande. The president Françoise Hollande described the attacks as an “act of war” planned by the Islamic State (BBC: 2015).

### 3.2.Short Term Recovery

The recovery strategy started immediately as the attacks were taking place in several locations. The president was informed and taken to safety. At that particular moment he was in one of the targeted locations in the Stade de France. The stadium was being targeted from outside and three explosions detonated at 9.20 pm, 9.30 pm and 9.53 pm local time during a friendly football match between Germany and France. At the moment 80.000 sports fans had no idea about the attack believing the attack to be fireworks. At the end of the match fans gathered on the pitch since only three exits were open. (The Guardian: 2015).

President Hollande convened an emergency cabinet meeting with the Prime Minister Manuel Valls and Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve (BBC: 2015). As a consequence, stronger border controls were introduced and a state of emergency inside the country was declared. In addition, highly trained security forces were ordered to enter the Bataclan concert venue, one of the attack premises which was a concert hall, managing to kill one of three terrorists. The remaining two committed suicide by detonating themselves. This location was the deadliest leaving 89 casualties.

However, these were not the only terrorists involved, at the time it was believed that nine terrorists were directly involved, and one suspect named Salah Abdeslam was on the run. It is believed that the terrorist attacked in three teams. In addition to the three terrorists at the Bataclan concert venue, three terrorists detonated themselves outside the Stade de France, another terrorist died using the same method at the Comptoir Voltaire cafe on the Boulevard Voltaire (BBC: 2015).

The crisis was still ongoing as the whole city, country and world were in a state of shock and paralyzed (BBC: 2015).The city was placed on lockdown, parts of the metro, schools and several tourists' locations e.g. Eiffel tower were closed down (BBC: 2015).

In the days to follow French policemen were ordered to raid various locations throughout the country in order to search and find suspects. (BBC: 2015) One of these raids was conducted in the Saint Denis area of Paris where the attack organizer Abdelhamid Abaaoud was shot together with another terrorist. This raid is believed to have avoided another imminent attack (BBC: 2015). Abdelhamid Abaaoud was a Belgian national and was raised in Molenbeek, a poor district with high unemployment with a majority of Arab immigrant population. He, as well as the other terrorist are believed to have been recruited by the Islamic State militant group (IS) (BBC: 2015). The French Interior Minister said their

operation plan was always equal, attacks were prepared from the exterior by jihadists with a European passport, who were trained and then returned to the EU to execute an attack (BBC: 2015).

### 3.3. Communication

Koblin (2015) notes that the media covered extensively the attack, international news channels such as CNN send around 70 employees from different offices to cover the attack. Media channels used titles such as `Carnage in Paris` using words such as carnage and massacre (Koblin: 2015). Elliott (2015) notes that although the media was covering the attack around the clock extensively they clearly distinct between facts that were known and unverified reports during the attack to keep the public informed. In addition to traditional media such as (newspaper, TV, radio) the internet and especially social media are important communication channels. News, official statements and eyewitness experiences can be shared instantly making it the most important platform after an attack. Unfortunately, a lot of misinformation can also arise and be spread, fueling fear and prejudices (Lee: 2015).

However, it is believed that social media can also have a positive impact after an attack. Social media site Facebook activated its Safety check tool, enabling users to check for friends' safety during an attack and also mark themselves as safe. This was the first time the tool was used following a terrorist attack (Zeisler: 2015) Several platforms were used to offer support using the following hash tags #PrayforParis, #ParisAttacks and #PorteOuvrte (open door). The last hash tag was used to offer accommodation for stranded people in Paris (Zeisler: 2015). In addition, several organizations e.g. Eurostars and Air France used social media to support and update their customers (Zeisler: 2015).

**The DMO:** According to a response from an employee from the Paris Tourism Board (attached in Appendix 1), the institution responded to the attack mainly on the web, through their website and social media channels such as Facebook. DMO uses website and social media to recover and re-boost the tourism sector. Their main task was to transmit information articles about opened or closed touristic sites daily and showed cases of touristic professionals that had been affected by the lack of tourism. In addition, they developed a video named " Paris vous dit merci " (*Paris says thank you* video link attached in Appendix 2) as well as new campaigns to trigger tourism. According to the Paris Convention and Visitors Bureau (2017)

the first of many campaigns named "My Romantic Paris" was launched in cooperation of the City, Region and the State as part of their recovery plan. The campaign focuses on Valentine's Day encouraging tourists to Paris for a romantic getaway. Over the year more campaigns will follow such as "Paris Night and Festive" in May-June, "Outdoor and Family Paris" in the summer 2017 and "the fairy winter" in November-December 2017, which are available on social networks and will encourage tourist to visit Paris ( Paris poursuit son plan de relance du tourisme: 2017).

### **3.4. Governmental Measures**

As mentioned before, the government introduced a state of emergency. But what did this actually mean? According to Partland (2016) the state of emergency allowed police forces to raid homes in search of suspects and placing them under arrest for a period of time without juridical requirements. The state of emergency was meant to last 12 days; however, it was extended several times until 2017 (Partland: 2016). In addition, President Hollande declared three of national mourning (Europe 1: 2015).

Other measures of protection that the government took were enabling police officers to carry their gun at all times and easing the guidelines on when to use them on suspects, as well as the power to detain suspicious persons for up to four hours (Partland: 2016). The government also tightened security in public transport enabling police officers to search suspicious passengers, moreover several metal detectors were set up at train stations such as Gare du Nord in Paris (Partland: 2016). Other reactions included permitting authorities to spy on digital and mobile communication devices without legal authorization, banning radical websites, preventing possible terrorist to leave the country, life imprisonment for convicted terrorists (Partland: 2016).

### **3.5. Involvement EU**

Following the attack, the EU stood together with France and promised support with security measures. After ongoing investigations, it was clear that there had been a lack of transparency and cooperation between Belgium and French intelligent services, since many of the terrorist were known, but information about them was not shared between the two security

services (Partland: 2016). As a consequence of the attacks the two countries promised to increase cooperation (Partland: 2016).

Four months after the attack the last suspect Salah Abdeslam, a French citizen which had managed to escape in Paris, was captured in the district of Molenbeek in Brussels along with four other suspects and questioned by Belgian authorities (CNN: 2016). French authorities requested extradition to France for a trial and managed that: Abdeslam was also held and questioned in France (CNN: 2016). According to BBC (2015) Abdeslam is currently being held in a prison in France near the border to Belgium and refusing to cooperate, his trial is expected to start in 2018 were he could face a sentence of maximum 20 years.

The following subchapter will elaborate on the effects of the terrorist attack, as illustrated in the ‘TourMis’ database.

### 3.6. Effects after the Terrorist Attack


In the following chapter we will focus on the effects the terrorism attack had on Paris tourism industry.

The quantitative effects of the attack in Paris can be visualized through the number of arrivals following the incident in the short term using monthly data provided by 'TourMis' for the year 2015. The short-term effects can be seen in the table 1 and graph 1 below. The number of arrivals in hotel and similar establishments in the city area are visible only from total foreign and total domestic.

**Table 1: Number of overnights in 2015**

Period	Absolute
2015/1	1 063 085
2015/2	1 029 415
2015/3	1 246 929
2015/4	1 310 176
2015/5	1 364 343
2015/6	1 454 567
2015/7	1 455 061
2015/8	1 286 698
2015/9	1 418 130
2015/10	1 450 306
2015/11	1 094 581
2015/12	1 065 894

**Graph 1 : Seasonality 2015**



(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgi-bin/tmintro.pl>)

According to the statistical data one can see that there is a dramatic decrease of arrivals compared from 1.450.306 in October to 1.094.581 (-24,5%) in November and even less to 1.065.895(-26,5%) in December. One could argue that this could be a natural decrease due to seasonality of a destination similar to the lower numbers seen in August.

However, when the figures are compared to the November and December tourist arrival figures for the past two years it is immediately clear that this is an alarming result and most likely a direct effect of the attack.

Figures for the past two years are provided in the following table:

**Table 2: Tourist arrival figures November-December 2013-2015**

Year	2013	2014	2015	% change (14/15)
November	1,300,293	1,233,985	1.094.581	-11,3%
December	1,304,402	1,277,850	1.065.894	-16,6%

(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgi-bin/tmintro.pl>)


By looking at annual data in the long term from the years 2010 until 2015 using again the same parameters as for the monthly data, one can see that 2015 was the second lowest year. 2010 which was the lowest with 15.183.838 could be explained by the global world recession of 2009. Since then, the number of arrivals has always been above 15.460.000 until 2015.

Unfortunately, the 2016 and 2017 statistics are not provided in TourMis, thus making it not possible to see if the numbers have recovered and grown again.

**Table 3: Number of arrivals in 2015**

Period	Absolute
2 010	15 183 838
2 011	15 638 688
2 012	15 707 699
2 013	15 692 293
2 014	15 468 279
2 015	15 239 185

**Graph 2: Paris total arrivals 2010-2015**



(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgibin/tmintro.pl>)

Looking at Paris incl. neighboring areas arrivals and overnight of total domestic and foreign in Table 4 we can see that there is a drop of 4,5% in arrivals and 8,2% in bed nights. Unfortunately, the 2017 numbers are not released yet to make a comparison.


**Table 4 : Paris Arrivals and Bednights 2012-2017**

	Arrivals		Bednights	
	absolute	% p.y.	absolute	% p.y.
2 012	22 392 152	-1,8	50 188 081	0,2
2 013	22 732 715	1,5	49 926 209	-0,5
2 014	22 420 548	-1,4	48 971 316	-1,9
2 015	22 176 628	-1,1	47 959 516	-2,1
2 016	21 177 873	-4,5	44 016 074	-8,2
2 017				

(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgibin/tmintro.pl>)

Looking at the main Markets of Paris in Figure 7 provided by the tourism board we can see that almost all of them are in decline in 2016. Hopefully the 2017 numbers will be more promising reaching the numbers of tourist arrivals and overnight stays before the attack.

**Figure 7: Paris Main Markets**



(Source: ParisInfo, <https://press.parisinfo.com/key-figures/key-figures>)

## 4. Case Study Brussels

### 4.1. Background

The Brussels attack happened on the 22nd of March of 2016. Terrorist used explosions in two different locations bombing the check-in area of the airport of Brussels and the Maelbeek metro station located in the city center near the European Commission Headquarters (BBC:2016). According to the Belgium crisis center (IBZ: 2016) 32 people were killed and 340 injured. The perpetrators belonged to the terrorist cell that was responsible for the Paris attacks (BBC: 2017).

### 4.2. Short Term Recovery

In order to recover from this attack and establish security across the city, the country and beyond, the Belgian crisis center started their recovery strategy. The measures taken are detailed below:

As a first measure the city went on lock down, closing the airport and metro. Belgian officials advised the public to use social media in order to reach family and friends, since telephone networks might be congested (Peterson: 2016). The metro was re-opened the same day, the airport resumed operation on the 3rd of April (BBC: 2016).

Following the attack, the police was ordered to arrest several suspects and conduct a number of raids leading to the arrest of one key suspect pictured in a security video. In addition, the same explosive which had been used in the Paris attack was found at the suspects address preventing another possible strike. Soldiers were ordered to patrol the city (BBC: 2016).

### **4.3. Communication and Social Media**

Similar to Paris, Facebook again turned on the safety check tool enabling users to mark themselves as safe and checking for friends and families safety status (Peterson: 2016). In order to decrease panic and also provide citizens with valuable information, the government used numerous channels including TV, radio and social media.

**DMO:** The Brussels tourism Board had a very important role during the recovery. According to Trauwaen Marketing and Sales director of the Brussels' DMO (2017) the recovery consisted of a 4-fold Strategy. The first was to inform and support immediately after the attack tourists and partners through updating website information, putting in place information desks at all Belgian airports, establishing call centers for congress delegates, briefing partners among other measures. They also informed about opened or closed tourists attractions (Trauwaen: 2017). Other measures included broadcasting testimonials and live webcams of the Gran place. The second strategy was to amplify solidarity. Fear was turned into empathy & sympathy. In order to reassure tourists, positive feelings were generated through creative campaigns featuring the *#relax in Brussels*. The following image Figure 8 is one of four used in this campaign stating " The most dangerous thing about Belgium is its chocolate because of the risk of cholesterol (Trauwaen: 2017).

**Figure 8: Campaign Image following Attack Brussels' Tourism Board**



(Source: Visit.Brussels)

The third strategy was to demonstrate the fact that life goes on. After a few difficult days it was communicated that everything was working normally, and life had moved on. Several touristic sites and public services had reopened. To demonstrate this, several campaigns were introduced, through social media. These campaigns were meant to reach a large number of people, showing normality through pictures of the city. In addition, summer campaigns were launched on social media and the web offering special accommodations deals and a weekend holiday price. Summing all online promotion, up to a total of 34.240.005 impressions were shared. The online traffic increased to 160.280 additional visits (Trauwaen: 2017).

Moreover, press activities such as press trips and partnerships with airlines carriers were expanded. The DMO also collaborated with external communication platforms such as Expedia, Trip advisor or Media groups to boost tourism. The final strategy consisted of letting other speak such as tourists, local & expats, congress attendees, press and key influences to generate a level of trust and credibility (Trauwaen: 2017).

Between the 10<sup>th</sup> of June and 30<sup>th</sup> of September the DMO collaborated with 32 key influencers that had 4.479.933 followers in total. Looking back at the attack the DMO notes the importance of being prepared since a crisis can hit at any time. To do so, the DMO argues that a crisis management team is essential. The team should include a clear chain of command

when taking decisions and answering press requests. The management of communication plays a vital role. This should be honest, fast, frequent and factual and it should be coordinated between "communicators" to ensure coherence. In addition, it is important to include all stakeholders such as hotels, travel agencies, congress centers and support them by working together. This support can be given through flexibility when working with them. Stakeholders are the key when rebuilding a destination (Trauwaen: 2017).

#### **4.4. Governmental Measures**

Following the attack, the terrorist threat was raised to the highest level (BBC: 2016). Three days of national mourning were implemented (NY Times: 2016). The parliament ordered a commission to investigate the attacks and the failure of preventing it. The commission published three reports focusing on the emergency response, the security architecture and countering radicalism. (Lasoen: 2017). According to the Economist (2017) the government had announced 30 measures in 2016 of which 26 either already practiced or will be set in the short term. Among these measures is the prohibition of the use of unregistered sim cards for cell phones. Another measure is putting in place prevention units monitoring radicalization in affected districts. Monitoring phones and emails of suspects is also permitted as well as the suspension of passports. Counter terrorism financing and fighting against arms trafficking are also measures taken by the government (The Economist: 2017).

#### **4.5. Involvement EU**

A number of Western European countries increased their security measures after the attack increasing their security staff across train stations, airports and borders (BBC: 2016). As a sign of solidarity several landmarks were illuminated with the Belgian national flag colors black red and yellow. This included the Eiffel Tower in Paris, the Brandenburger Tor in Berlin, the Trevi Fountain in Rome among others (Vitkovskaya: 2016).

In addition, EU Ministers for Justice and Home affairs expressed their support and condolences to the victims. Furthermore, the Ministers condemned the attack and stated that in order to combat collectively terrorism attacks many actions are needed (European Council: 2016). They stated that an investigation of the network involved in the Paris and Brussels attack was needed. Another action was making certain that passenger information units (PIUs)

e.g. airlines send data to criminal police offices. Other actions were to implement the fight against terrorist financing and document fraud. The EU committed to strengthen the anti-terror cooperation between Turkey and North African countries, Middle East and Western Balkan. Interoperability of security databases was also vital to ensure a trustworthy identify verification. This would be possible through a European automated fingerprint recognition system. Another priority was to find adequate ways to find digital evidence. This is important in order to prevent an attack; such digital evidence can be for example signs of radicalization. This could be countered through rehabilitee programs. Other actions included the support of Counter Terrorism Groups, the use of Joint investigations teams from different states in the European counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) (European Council: 2016).

The following subchapter will elaborate on the effects of the terrorist attack, as illustrated in the ‘TourMis’ database.

#### **4.6. Effects after the Terrorist Attack**


The effects of the attack can be visualized through the number of arrivals following the incident in the short term, by using monthly data provided by 'TourMis' for the year 2016. The short-term effects can be seen in Table 5 and Graph 3 by looking at the number of arrivals in hotel and similar establishments in the city area only from total foreign and total domestic. Unfortunately, data was only available from January 2016 until September 2016.

**Table 5: Number of Arrivals January-September 2016**

Period	absolute
2016/1	212 850
2016/2	242 092
2016/3	228 712
2016/4	214 060
2016/5	242 642
2016/6	251 572
2016/7	235 877
2016/8	212 907
2016/9	262 767
2016/10	292 145
2016/11	284 873
2016/12	294 397

(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgi-bin/tmintro.pl>)

**Graph 3: Brussel Total Arrivals January-December**



(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgibin/tmintro.pl>)

Looking at the statistical data there are three numbers that stand out: January, April and August. All of the months have very low arrival numbers. The number of arrivals in January could be explained due to low season. In April the month after the attack the arrival numbers decrease radically to 214.060 (-6,4 %). In order to have a better understanding of this drop the number of arrivals from April 2015 and 2014 will be examined. Following the month of April, the number of arrivals seem to recover only dropping again in August to 202.149. This drop in August could be due to low season and summer holidays travelers inclined more to travel to a beach destination rather than a city. However, this is pure speculation, so we will also have a look at the past two years for January, April and August to gain a better understanding in Table 6.

**Table 6: Arrival Numbers January, April and August 2014-2016**

	2014	% change	2015	% change	2016	% change	2017
January	219.696	-3,4	215.227	-6,3	212.850	-0.6	211.494
April	301.183	-4,0	297.247	-31,7	214.060	+33.4	285.654
August	292.535	-5,5	293.860	-31,0	212.907	+23.1	262,051

(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgibin/tmintro.pl>)

Examining the past two years one can assume that January has been a low season of arrivals in the past two years, so it is not surprising to have a low number of arrivals in 2016. However, April and August have had very good performance arrival numbers in the past two years. It is thus very likely that the April arrival number is due to the attack and the August arrival number decrease is not due to low season as was speculated before but could also be a result of the terrorist attack since a large number of tourists travel in the summer and might have rethought their choice to visit Brussels this summer.

Moving to the monthly numbers of 2017 we can see that the destination has clearly recovered with a more than +30% improvement in April and more than +20% in August given this is a great signal, surely the numbers of arrivals similar to 2015 before the attack happened will be reached in 2018.


By looking at annual data in the long term from the years 2010 until 2017 in Table 7 and Graph 4 using again the same parameters as for the monthly data, one can see that 2016 was the lowest year. 2010 with 2.974.894 following the attack. This meant a 15,8% drop from 2014. Since then, the number of arrivals has always been recovering reaching 3.389.804 in 2017. At this pace it is likely to reach arrival numbers before the attack and continue growing.

**Table 7: Arrivals Brussels 2010-2017**

	Arrivals
2 010	3 000 048
2 011	3 182 938
2 012	3 170 645
2 013	3 290 603
2 014	3 420 194
2 015	3 534 106
2 016	2 974 894
2 017	3 389 804

(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgi-bin/tmintro.pl>)

**Graph 4: Brussels Total Arrivals 2010-2017**



(Source: TourMis, <http://www.tourmis.info/cgi-bin/tmintro.pl>)

## 5. Discussion

This paper aimed to outline the impacts of terrorism on tourism and identify recovery strategies used in general after a crisis. It focused on two study cases: Paris and Brussels. The available information on impacts of terrorism on tourism showcased how terrorism raises fear and safety concerns leading to tourist cancellations and tourism shifts to other destinations after an attack. It was illustrated a big economic impact on different stakeholders and organizations such as hotels, restaurants, shops, airlines, museums and many more.

However, when it comes to recovery strategies the few researches conducted by other authors focused on different crises in general, for example natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, so the research works were not specifically referring to terrorism only. Although different crisis situations have similar procedures when it comes to recovering, it was difficult to assess what the best practice following a terrorist attacks could be.

Faulkner (2001) established a comprehensive general framework on stages of a crisis and how to respond to it. In the case studies analyzed we identified several stages and what stakeholders such as the government or DMO did in the case of Paris or Brussels. It was seen that in both cases the pattern was similar by establishing safety and security first from a governmental side, by increasing security and arresting possible suspects. Furthermore, a

political and diplomatic solidarity on an international level was created through a better future cooperation and communication with neighboring countries.

In both cases the DMO played an important role through media campaigns. In addition, the effects can be decreased if the entities involved (hotels, authorities) establish a communication channel by first mitigating the risk internally. After gaining the internal control they could turn towards the outside world where they could coordinate with all regional stakeholders, engaging the local community and leading local media towards positive success stories, on one hand in order to recreate the safety feeling and on the other hand to convey the idea that life can now follow its normal course.

## **6. Final Remarks**

In conclusion, terrorism acts will most likely never be absolutely predictable or avoidable leaving no destination immune to a terrorist crisis. Fortunately, they are relatively rare occurrences and governments as well as tourism organization have the ability to reduce their impact through the use as well as the development of recovery strategies. It is important to learn the responses from destinations that have been affected from terrorist attacks in the past in order to see if their implemented recovery strategies were effective. Effective strategies can then be used by another destination facing a similar terrorist attack in the future in order to develop their own recovery strategy. There are, however, relatively limited numbers of papers which showcase the impact of terrorism on tourism and how a destination can bounce back and revive after a terrorist attack.

This paper has attempted to address this problem by showing the effects of terrorism on tourism as well as by outlining the recovery strategies pursued after the Paris November 2015 terrorism attack and the Brussels March 2016 attack and assess their effectiveness.

While terrorism attacks are beyond the control of the most advanced security measures, their impacts can be reduced by planning and management practices. Some destinations and tourists' attractions will more likely be the targets of an attack. In these cases, actions can be taken to either avoid or reduce the damage of an attack. These high-risk locations can be protected through architectural measures such as large anti-terror plant pots, by bollards. In the future, cities will most likely implement more and more of this anti-terror architectural steps to secure government buildings, tourism attractions, shopping streets to name a few.

However, as mentioned before security measures can only reduce the impact in case of an attack and not avoid every attack. This is why the most important step for a destination is to assess their risks and develop prior to a terrorist attack their own recovery plan in order to be prepared. This plan could be based on actual cases of terrorist attacks. Following a number of attacks in Europe it is believed that governments and destinations are now more aware of the danger and invest more resources into their prevention and recovery plans. Hopefully in the future destinations will be better prepared in dealing with terrorist situations and implementing effective responses.

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
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## Appendix

Image 1 shows the different locations that were targeted during the attack in Paris.



(Source: BBC, 2014)


- Globally, the attacks have impacted our information on the web, not only because it is there where we have reacted (social media + film « Paris vous dit merci » + information articles day after day about the sites that were open or closed...), but mostly because it is that media (internet site + social medias) that we use to re-boost the attractive side of the destination (new contents, showing offers from professionals that were particularly affected by the loss of tourists, development of themes and special operations...). On the print side, booklets etc., because of the content, our editorial side can't be affected.

Thomas, for Paris je t'aime

(Source: Paris Tourism Board)

- Link to the Paris Tourism Board showing support after the attack:  
Thank you from Paris video <https://en.parisinfo.com/thank-you-from-paris>  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiSBZBXj00c&feature=youtu.be>

- Image 2 shows the different locations that were targeted the attack in Brussels



(Source BBC,2015)